While many studies have examined the cost-containment aspect of Medical savings accounts (MSA), few have investigated the adequacy of MSA to finance the health care expenditure. This paper estimates the present value of lifetime healthcare expenses (PVHE) of the Singaporean male and female elderly upon retirement at age 62. The estimation involves calibrating the stream of future healthcare expenditure; stochastic forecasting of cohort survival probabilities; and discounting the projected lifetime healthcare expenditure. Estimated values of the PVHE under various scenarios are used to assess the adequacy of the government-decreed minimum saving to be maintained in the MSA.
Introduction
Among healthcare reforms in the last decade, medical savings accounts (MSA) have been proposed as an alternative sustainable healthcare financing scheme (see Goodman and Musgrave 1992) . Indeed, Schieber (1997) and Prescott (1998) have labelled MSA as 'an innovation' in the design of health financing instruments. In view of the failure of implementing large-scale healthcare reform, Pauly and Goodman (1995a) also proposed the use of MSAs in conjunction with high-deductibles health insurance as an alternative incremental reform.
The appeal of MSA reform comes from its non-distortionary impacts on individuals' incentives and hence is perceived to be efficient. 1 Instead of employers spending on expensive, low-deductible health insurance policy, under MSA plan, employers (and employees) would contribute to a medical savings accounts, which is usually tax exempted. MSA is often accompanied by a high-deductible catastrophic medical insurance, the premiums for which may be paid out from the account. As such, MSA departs from the third-party financing and holds individuals responsible for their healthcare consumption funded from their savings. It thus resolves the over-consumption of health services associated with third party financing and leads to efficiency gains from the elimination of welfare loss caused by moral hazard.
The growing interests on MSAs hinge on their potential positive impacts to contain cost of health spending by making consumers price sensitive and giving consumers an incentive to choose appropriate and cost-effective care. However, only a few countries have experimented with MSAs. Singapore is the first country to implement a nation-wide compulsory medical savings, known as the Medisave in 1984. A decade later, in December 1994, China also implemented MSAs for the urban formal sector employees nation-wide, after piloting the scheme in the cities of Zhenjian and Jiujang (Yip and Hsiao, 1997) . The United States and South Africa have also recently experimented with voluntary small scale MSAs.
While some economists support the advantages of MSA, others are more sceptical. For example, Shortt (2002) studied the public systems of China and Singapore and conducted simulation analysis based on the United States Medicare data and found that MSA by itself has not controlled costs and may increase inequalities in the publicly funded systems. Like Shortt (2002) , both Hurley (2002) and Forget et al. (2002) also concluded that MSAs are unlikely to advance key Canadian health policy goals with respect to cost control. However, Hanvoravongchai (2002) is of the view that the available evidence on the impact of MSAs on health systems is inconclusive, and that
MSAs are neither a panacea nor a catastrophe for health care systems, and must be evaluated in the context of the entire financing scheme.
Most research have focused on the efficiency issues of MSAs in terms of cost containment and reducing welfare costs generated by moral hazard. (see also Barr 2001 , Pauly 2001 . 2 However, this paper concentrates on the very intent of creating the 4 savings account. One of the key objectives of Medisave is to mobilize resources for sustainable healthcare spending over the long term. A pertinent issue is whether the accumulated compulsory medical savings would be adequate to fund healthcare expenditures in times of needs. To address these issues, the Singapore government has implemented many regulations regarding the accumulation and utilisation of Medisave.
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To help fulfil its role as a pre-funded scheme for medical care, a minimum sum scheme was also instituted. Under this scheme, upon retirement at age 62, members are not allowed to withdraw the full amount of savings but must keep a decreed minimum amount with the Central Provident Fund Board. 4 In this paper, we examine how much medical savings the Singaporean elderly ought to have to adequately finance their medical expenses over the post-retirement period. We begin with a brief review of healthcare financing in Singapore in Section 2.
In Section 3, we discuss in details the framework used to estimate the present value of lifetime healthcare expenses of the elderly. These involve three subsections, namely:
calibrating the stream of future healthcare expenditure; stochastic forecasting of cohort survival probabilities; and discounting the projected lifetime health care expenses. The projected expenses are calibrated using the survey results of a longitudinal study of transition in health and wealth of the elderly Singaporeans. The survival rates of the elderly are obtained mainly through the well-established Lee-Carter demographic method; and the yield curves are delineated by the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross stochastic interest 3 The details are given in Section 2.1 of this paper. 4 The Central Provident Fund (CPF) Board, a statutory board under the Ministry of Manpower in Singapore, administers and manages the compulsory savings scheme. The details are given in Section 2 of this paper. See also Chia and Tsui (2003) for other institutional details regarding the CPF.
5 rate model and two deterministic models. In Section 4, we present estimates of the present value of the healthcare expenses of the elderly under various scenarios. In Section 5, we assess the adequacy of medical savings accounts and draw some policy implications.
Healthcare financing in Singapore
The philosophy of the Singapore's healthcare financing system is based on individual responsibility. To prevent and curb excessive demand, the Government consciously designs policies away from third-party payments and towards cost sharing.
This philosophy of co-payment is built into the various health-financing schemes, underlining the idea that there can be "no free lunch''. 5 Policy formulation is skewed towards efficiency and less on equity considerations. Patients have to pay part of the cost of medical care and are expected to pay more for higher-level services.
Healthcare financing in Singapore is an integrated system of a compulsory savings account (Medisave), a catastrophic medical insurance scheme (Medishield) and a means-tested medical expense assistance scheme (Medifund). These schemes are generally referred to as the 3Ms. In addition, there is a fourth M which is a managed care which operates within the private health insurance scheme.
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In what follows, we highlight the main features of healthcare financing in Singapore.
5 This is in contrast to the WHO's ideal that prepayment as cornerstone of a fair health system financing.
The argument being that prepayment affords protection against paying out of pocket, ensures accessibility and allows for efficiency gains through risk pooling. For most countries, the prepayment system operates mainly through the social-security system or national health insurance schemes. 6 This will not be discussed in this paper as the fourth M has not taken off successfully despite the strong promotion by the government. 6
Medical savings accounts (Medisave)
The concept of mandatory savings is not new for Singapore and its introduction was accepted without resistance. As early as 1955, Singapore had already instituted a compulsory savings scheme for old age under the Central Provident Fund (CPF) scheme.
Medisave is also administered by the CPF Board. Under the compulsory savings scheme, every employee and employer is required to contribute a proportion of the monthly wage to the CPF. The rates vary according to the age of the employees. The contribution goes into the employee's three accounts: Ordinary Account, Special Account and Medisave
Account (see Table 1 ). These savings while earn interest, are fully tax exempted.
Savings in the Special account can only be withdrawn upon retirement but savings in both the Ordinary and Special Accounts can be withdrawn even before retirement for home purchases and other approved investments.
== Table 1 == Contribution rates to the medical savings account follow three tiers, with the rates increasing according to age and with a specified maximum contribution per month.
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There is a set limit on the total amount accumulated in Medisave. As of Besides personal responsibility, the compulsory medical savings also incorporates features of family support. This is in line with the official philosophy of promoting family responsibility in the area of healthcare financing. Although Medisave does not allow for risk pooling across individuals, it allows risk pooling among family members (including spouse, children, parents and grand-parents). Indeed, Table 2 shows that children's Medisave has been a major source of healthcare financing for the elderly. 
==

Medical insurance for catastrophic illnesses (Medishield)
To counter the inefficiency loss from the absence of risk pooling and the possible inadequacy of medical savings account, two different forms of insurance are provided.
The first provision is in an implicit form, in terms of government subsidies for hospital care. Except for higher class ward A which is unsubsidised, the other lower wards are.
The level of subsidy varies according to ward types: 20% of cost for B1 ward, 50% for B2+ ward, 65% for B2 ward and 80% for C ward. A comparison of the different ward classes is given in Appendix 1. The second provision is an explicit low-cost national catastrophic illness insurance scheme (Medishield). Medishield was implemented in 1990
but departed from the open-ended, unrestricted medical insurance as practiced in most developed countries. For economies of scale and to minimize administrative costs,
Medishield is administered by the CPF Board.
9 For patients who stay beyond the high-trimmed point (HTP) for the given DRG, additional reimbursements are given on a per diem basis. The MOH sets the guidelines for MWL, HTP and outlier MWL for each DRG.
10 It is estimated that with DRG MWL, fewer than 4% of the subsidized patients in B2 class ward (which are entitled to 50% subsidies) in restructured hospitals need to pay out of pocket. Before the introduction of DRG MWL, almost 20% of the B2 class patients had to pay out of pocket. Furthermore, there are proposals to raise the claim limits for Medishield scheme so that patients may claim more for treatment and pay less out of pocket. (The Straits Times, March 19, 2003 and Parliamentary Debates, 2003) In the implementation of Medishield, there are built-in guidelines to prevent overprovision of and excessive demand for medical. To prevent an over-provision of medical services arising from third party payments, Medishield operates on a system of negotiated fee schedules to restrict the amount providers may charge the insurers.
Control is exercised through limits on the liability per individual and type of illnesses. 11 MediShield starts paying when the total claimable medical expenses exceed the deductibles. The deductibles are varies from S$500 a year for patients in a ward with 7 or more beds (C ward) to $1,000 a year for patients in other ward classes. MediShield pays 80% of the amount in excess of the deductibles and the insured pays the remaining 20% co-insurance. There is also maximum amount claimable which is set at $30,000 for a policy year and $120,000 for a lifetime. These amounts are based on the average charges incurred by patients in a 6-bedded ward (B2 ward) in a public hospital.
12 Medishield Plus is an enhanced Medishield Scheme. It caters for those who want to be admitted to higher-class wards in either a public or a private hospital. There are two plans under Medishield Plus. Plan A reimburses up to $623 per day of hospitalization (with a deductible of $4000) and Plan B which pays up to $375 per day (with a deductible of $2500). The premium for Plan A and Plan B are 5 and 3 times of the basic Medishield premium respectively. Medishield has been operating at a deficit for several years. 
Present value of healthcare expenditure
Under the current financing framework, patients in the public sector restructured hospitals are subsidised according to the ward class of their choice. It is the patients' responsibility to ensure that they choose a ward class that is affordable and they are expected to pay the unsubsidised portion of the medical costs. For non-catastrophic illness, the unsubsidised portion is paid out from Medisave (subject to its withdrawal rules) and then from out-of-pocket. For catastrophic illnesses, Medishield reimbursement is available for expenditures that exceed the "deductible" as described in Section 2.2.
However, Medishield pays only 80% of the excess up to a pre-set claimable limits 
Calibration of healthcare expenditure
The key determinants of healthcare expenses of the elderly depend on the demographic and health sector related factors. Unfortunately, there is no published disaggregated data on the medical expenditure of the elderly by gender and by age. In order to reasonably estimate the medical care expenditure, we make use of an unpublished longitudinal study by Chan (2001) 
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We want to point out that the average medical expenditure for the elderly is consistent with the published data on the average hospital inpatient bill size for the three hospitals with geriatric departments in Singapore. 18 Since most of the elderly in the sample under study do not have private health insurance, it is expected that the average inpatient bill for the subsidized ward are reasonably close to the out-of-pocket expenditure. This is further supported by Koh (1998) that the age profile of the insured exhibited a downward trend for the older age group. Those aged 55 and above constituted about 5% of the insured base, while those age 60 and above accounted for only 2%.
Essentially the calibration of future healthcare expenditure involves three steps. Tables 4 and 5 by a cumulative factor assuming at a constant annual growth rate for x years. Second, we pick a flat rate of 4% as the benchmark for the annual growth rate of healthcare expenses. This is because over the period from 1990
to 2001, the published average nominal annual growth rate of medical care in Singapore 16 is about 3.8%. 19 Next, we convert the calibrated medical expenses at age (62 + x) into monthly expenses by taking the monthly average of the calibrated figure within year (2003 + x) . Finally, the present value 20 of healthcare expenditure (PVHE) of the elderly by sex at age 62 is obtained by discounting the stream of calibrated monthly healthcare expenses, weighted by the survival probability of the elderly over the entire postretirement period. The choice of discount rates and computation of the survival probability of the elderly by sex and by age will be discussed in Sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
In order to conduct sensitivity analysis of the PVHE, we also set the annual growth rates of medical expenditure in Singapore to 3% and 5%, respectively. These growth rates are chosen to mimic the ageing experiences of Japan and the OECD countries. For example, Nakanishi and Nakayama (2001) reported that the medical expenditure in Japan grew at an annual rate of 5.5% from 1980 to 1994. Mayhew (2000) , based on the past 30 years experiences of the OECD countries, extrapolated the underlying rate of medical expenditure growth to about 4%. The streams of future monthly healthcare expenditures at these alternative growth rates were then calibrated accordingly as in the benchmark case.
Discount rates
The calibrated stream of future healthcare expenses are to be discounted by the appropriate yield curves. We employ two alternatives to model the structure of interest rates: a stochastic model and two deterministic models. 
where r t is the short-rate at time t. The second term on the right-hand side of (2) captures the deterministic trend which consists of the long-term average interest rate, r a , and the speed of mean-reversion, θ, respectively. For θ > 0, r t is expected to decrease and revert to r a if the current rate is above the long-run mean, and vice versa. The third term captures the stochastic part, consisting of independently and identically distributed standard normal random variable ε t +1 ; and β is the volatility parameter.
The deterministic interest rate models used to discount the future cash flows are the constant yield curve (CYC) model and the fixed yield curve (FYC) model. The CYC model sticks to a flat annual rate to discount all future cash flows. Choices include 2%, 3%, 4% and 5%, respectively. In particular, the 4% flat rate can be regarded as the 21 See "Term-Structure Models" in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Chapter 11) . 22 Tse (1995) is the only available empirical study on the stochastic behaviour of 3-month Treasury-bill rates in Singapore. He finds that the CIR model provides reasonable replicates of the yield curves. Lachance et al. (2003) also use the CIR approach to model yield curves in simulation exercises on optionembedded defined contribution pensions.
average of nominal rates historically paid on the Medisave accounts. 23 The FYC model is constructed using the average of the available historical rates for the government bonds issued in Singapore since 1988. They comprise 2.3% for 3-month bills, 2.5% for 1-year bills, 3.0% for 2-year bonds, 3.9% for 5-year bonds, 3.8% for 7-year bonds, 4.3% for 10-year bonds and 3.9% for the 15-year bonds, respectively. We use the 15-year rate as proxy for spot rates with longer durations. Spot rates for other durations below 15 years are obtained by the method of interpolation.
Survival probabilities
Appropriate life tables are required to calculate the present value of the estimated healthcare expenses of the elderly. Based on the available 22 abridged life tables from 1980 to 2001, we follow the procedure in Chia and Tsui (2003) to construct the complete cohort life tables.
Basically the construction takes three main steps. First, we predict the future mortality rates of the elderly using the published abridged life tables for Singapore from 1980 to 1999. The following Lee-Carter (LC) model (1992 is used to fit mortality rates for the male and female elderly of age 62 to 85 and above:
where m x t is the central death rate in age class x in year t; a x is the additive age-specific constant, reflecting the general shape of the age schedule; b x is the responsiveness of 23 We are grateful to two referees for pointing out such an interpretation. The average annual rate is 4% for the period from 10/2001 to 9/2004. See data on interest rates at: http://www.cpf.gov.sg/cpf_info/In. mortality at age class x to variations in the general level; k t is a time-specific index of the general level of mortality; µ and φ are parameters; ε xt is the error to the actual age schedule, assuming to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and a constant variance; and η t is the white noise. Lee and Carter examine the long-term patterns of the natural logarithm of central death rates with the single time-specific index of mortality k t .
A lower order autoregressive process is included to absorb the dynamic relationship of k t between time (t -1) and t. The Lee-Carter model has been successfully applied to the G7 countries to forecast life expectancy at birth. See Tuljapurkar et al. (2000) .
Second, based on the predicted mortality rates obtained from the preceding step, the abridged cohort life tables are calibrated using techniques developed by Bourbeau et al. (1997) . Third, the calibrated abridged cohort mortality rates are converted into annual mortality rates using Pollard (1989) 's methodology. These annual mortality rates are then converted to monthly rates. Finally the monthly mortality rates are converted to monthly survival rates accordingly.
Results and discussions
We perform Monte Carlo experiments to estimate the present value of healthcare expenses (PVHE) for both male and female elderly at age 62 under the CIR model. Different values of PVHE are simulated with 10,000 replications using equations (1) and (2) under various combinations of interest rate paths, growth rates of healthcare expenses, and cohort survival probabilities by sex. All computations and estimations are coded in Gauss. We first simulate the PVHE based on the set of benchmark parameters. As 20 displayed in Table 6 , the calibrated parameters for the benchmark scenario include: the 4% medical growth rate; the long-term average rate at 4%, the initial rate at 2%, 3% and 4%; the mean reversion parameter θ at 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4; and the interest rate volatility parameter β at 0.01, 0.02 and 0.03 respectively. 24 For each combination of θ and β, the short-rates are aggregated to obtain the yield curve, which is used to discount the corresponding lifetime healthcare expenses. We repeat the procedure to obtain different PVHE corresponding to each of the nine different combinations of (θ, β) along with each of the initial rates. Finally, the reported PVHE is the average value of all the simulated PVHE from the 27 different combinations of the initial interest rates and (θ, β).
Besides the benchmark parameters, we conduct sensitivity analysis using: [a] different growth rates of medical expenses at 3% and 5%; Tables 7 and 8 report different values of the estimated PVHE using alternative parameterisation of medical expenditure growth rates, long term interest rates (r a ) and the deterministic rates.
== Tables 6, 7, 8 === 24 These calibrated values are based on the estimation results of the CIR model using the historical 3-month Treasury bill rates in Singapore. 25 As mentioned in footnote 20, all reported PVHE in Tables 7 and 8 As can be observed from Tables 7 and 8 , the estimated PVHE are reasonably robust to the different interest rate models. In particular, the PVHE for both the male and female elderly under the CIR and CYC models are all consistently close to each other in most of the scenarios. For example, under the benchmark (i.e., 4% medical growth rate and 4% mean interest rate), PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room are $24,557 and $24,676 under the CIR and CYC models, respectively; as compared to the corresponding $24,110 and $24,198 for the male elderly (see Table 7 , panel [b] ). Similar pattern is observed for those more well-to-do elderly living in the 5-room housing. However, discrepancies of PVHE between the female and male elderly become more alarming. For example, at the benchmark scenario, the estimated PVHE for the female elderly in 5-room are $38,245 and $38,523 under the CIR and CYC models; as compared to the corresponding $24,614 and $24,727 for the male elderly. See Table 8 , panel [b] for details.
The adequacy of MSA may be assessed by comparing the simulated values of PVHE with the decreed minimum sum. As can be gleaned from panel [b] in Tables 7 and   8 , the decreed amount of $25,000 in the medical savings accounts would be adequate for both the female and male elderly in the smaller 3-room and for the male elderly in the bigger 5-room at 4% medical expense growth rate and at higher discount rates of 4% or above. For the female elderly in 5-room, the decreed sum would be inadequate to meet the healthcare requirement at the different growth rates of medical expenses, even when higher discount rates such as 5%. For example, at the benchmark long-term interest rate 22 of average rate of 4%, the shortfall from the decreed sum increases from 34% to 54% and then to 75% as medical growth increases from 3% to 4% and then to 5%.
Turning to the elasticity of PVHE with respect to the growth rate of medical expenses and to the mean interest rates, we find relative uniformity in the magnitude for both the male and female elderly under the CIR and CYC models. 26 For example, a 1% increase in medical expenditure under the benchmark scenario leads to a 0.74% increase in PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room and 0.60% in 5-room. The corresponding increase for the male elderly in 3-room and 5-room housing are 0.61% and 0.58% respectively. A 1% increase in the long-term interest rate under the benchmark scenario leads to a 0.70% decrease in PVHE for the female elderly in 3-room and 0.50% in 5-room; and a corresponding 0.61% decrease for the male elderly in 3-room and 0.50% in 5-room. Hence, for both gender the PVHE is slightly more elastic to growth rates of healthcare expenses than to long-term interest rates charged to MSA.
Next, we shall explore the policy implications arising from a positive relationship between PVHE and medical growth rate, and a negative relationship between PVHE and the interest rate earned on MSA. Given the decreed minimum sum set at $25,000, it is interesting to know how policy makers would respond to a 1% increase in the medical growth rate. There are two options available: either raising the minimum sum amount without increasing the interest rate earned on MSA or increasing the interest rate earned on the MSA without raising the decreed minimum sum.
In what follows, we consider the impact of increasing the interest rate earned on MSA without raising the decreed minimum sum. If θ i is defined as the percentage change in the interest rate charged to MSA and θ g is the percentage change in healthcare growth rate, then the following relationship holds for a given level of PVHE,
where η h, g is the elasticity of PVHE with respect to the growth rate of healthcare expenses and η h i is the elasticity of PVHE with respect to interest rate charged to MSA.
Values of θ i could be computed from our simulated PVHE. For illustrative purposes, the estimated values of θ i under the benchmark scenario for the female and male elderly in 3-room are 1.06 and 1.0, respectively. This implies from equation (5) that for those elderly in 3-room, with a 1% increase in medical growth rate, the interest rate earned on MSA for the female and male elderly should be increased by 1.06% and 1.0%, respectively.
Similarly, the estimated values of θ i for the female and male elderly in 5-room are 1.20 and 1.16, respectively. This indicates that for a 1% increase in the medical growth rate, the interest rate earned on MSA for the female and male elderly should be increased by 1.20% and 1.16%, respectively. Such values of θ i may serve as useful guides to raise the interest rate charged on the MSA in order to ensure adequate savings to finance postretirement medical expenses without raising the decreed minimum sum. This policy option seems to be vital when the balance in the MSA is alarmingly below the decreed minimum sum. As shown in 
Concluding remarks
We have assessed the adequacy of using MSA to finance healthcare expenditure for the representative Singaporean male and female over their post-retirement period.
We estimate the present value of lifetime healthcare expenses of the elderly upon retirement at age 62 by gender and by income types which are stratified according to the dwelling types. Our approach involves calibrating the healthcare expenses of the elderly, constructing cohort mortality rates from abridged life tables and employing three different interest rate models to discount the future cash flows. The estimated healthcare expenses under different scenarios are then compared with the government decreed minimum sum in the medical savings accounts.
Our simulation results show that under the benchmark scenario, the decreed minimum balance of $25,000 in the individual Medisave account would be adequate for both the less well-off male and female elderly in the 3-room public housing at 4% medical cost growth and at 4% or higher discount rates. It is also adequate for the betteroff male elderly in the bigger 4 and 5-room flats, but not so for the female elderly. The inadequacy for the female elderly is in the range of 34% to 75% of the decreed sum of $25,000 and it becomes more severe when medical expense grows at higher rates.
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Our findings are consistent with the fact that Medisave has contributed to the framework of a cultural rhetoric of personal responsibility for health care (see Barr 2001) .
Indeed, Pauly and Goodman (1995b) , Massaro and Wong (1995) , Eiff et al. (2002) , Gratzer (2002) In order to keep the current decreed amount remain relatively unchanged at the decreed level of $25,000, our study suggests that for 1% increase in the growth rate of medical expenses, the interest rate earned on MSA ought to be increased to 1.06% and 1.0% respectively for the female and male elderly in 3-room flats; and to 1.20% and 1.16% for those in 4-and 5-room flats, respectively. However, the reality may be less rosy. According to the Ministry of Health in Singapore, only 56% of Singaporeans who reached age 55 in 2000 year have Medisave savings that were at least the Medisave minimum sum (which was decreed at $19,000). Table 9 shows that the average of Medisave balances of these Singaporeans were about $13,769. It also indicates that for those aged 60 to 64 in 2000, the average balance is 32% short of the decreed amount. It increases as we move up the age group. For example, the shortfall for those aged 60 to 27 Singapore's healthcare costs are around 3% of GDP, compared to 9.3% for Canada and 10.5% for Germany. However, there is a perception that great care must be exercised in attributing Singapore's low expenditure on health care to the MSA program. (Barr, 2001; Pauly, 2001) 26 64 is 53% and that for 70+ is 77%. Hence the impact of using MSA as a healthcare financing scheme should be evaluated within the entire health care financing framework.
The image of a three-legged stool has often been used to represent support in retirement (Cutler 1996) . A similar three-legged stool may be used to represent the alternative means of healthcare financing. They include a compulsory individual medical savings, a high-deductible medical insurance for catastrophic illnesses, and government insurance and assistance. In order to strengthen the leg of medical savings account, the This paper has confined its analysis to assessing the adequacy of the decreed amount in MSA for the Singaporean elderly to finance healthcare expenses in their postretirement. However, a more comprehensive evaluation should be conducted within the whole financing structure in the accumulation process of the forced savings in MSA, together with periodic fine tunings to ensure smooth functioning of the system. In addition, wider coverage of longitudinal surveys should be conducted to trace relationships between health spending and the demographic and health sector-related variables among different age groups of the elderly. These are left for future studies. 
